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Winter, Secretary of the Navy, ET AL. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., ET 
AL., 129 S.Ct. 365,  No. 07-1239 (U.S.  2008).  
Stacey M. Valentine* 
The United States Supreme Court Invalidates a Preliminary Injunction 
Prohibiting the Use of Mid-Frequency Active Sonar in Naval Training  
I. Background 
Several groups devoted to the protection of marine mammals and ocean 
habitats challenged the Navy's use of "mid-frequency active" ("MFA") sonar 
training, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the 
Navy's actions violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).  The plaintiffs, which include the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Jean-Michael Cousteau (an environmental 
enthusiast), and various other groups, argue that MFA can cause serious 
injuries to marine animals, including permanent hearing loss, decompression 
sickness, and major behavioral disruptions, and that these findings require the 
Navy to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) as required by the 
NEPA.  Winter, Secretary of the Navy, ET AL. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., ET AL., No. 07-1239, at 4 (U.S.  2008). They also contend that in 
areas off the coast of Southern California (SOCAL) where the Navy employs 
MFA sonar, several mass strandings of marine mammals have occurred and 
that a particular mammal—the beaked whale—is especially prone to injury and 
that any such injuries would go unnoticed due to the whales tendency to spend 
very little time at the surface.  Id.   
The Navy contends that after its initial analysis, it determined that its 
SOCAL training exercises would not have a significant impact on the 
environment, and as such, deemed its environmental assessment to be sufficient 
according to the terms of the NEPA.  Id. at 5.  The NEPA does not require an 
agency to prepare a full EIS if it determines based on an environmental 
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assessment that the proposed action will have little impact on the environment.  
Id.  The Navy estimated that the SOCAL training would physically injure only 
eight dolphins per year, and even these injuries could be prevented through the 
Navy's voluntary safety measures, given that lookouts can easily spot schools of 
dolphins.  Id.  at 6.  The number of affected beaked whales per year was 
estimated at 274, none of which would result in permanent injury.  Id.  In fact, 
the Navy contends that after 40 years of MFA sonar use, there has not been a 
single documented sonar-related injury to a marine mammal.  Id.  at 4.  It was 
in light of these findings that the Navy determined a full EIS was unnecessary.   
In addition, the Navy contends that its training exercises, during which the 
use of MFA sonar is employed, are essential to the maintenance of national 
security.  The Navy utilizes "strike groups" and MFA sonar to create a training 
experience that closely models the antisubmarine warfare that is currently the 
Pacific Fleet's top war-fighting priority.  Id. at 2.  Strike groups are groups of 
surface ships, submarines, and aircraft centered around an aircraft carrier or 
assault ship and seamless coordination between the strike group is critical.  Id.  
In order to successfully utilize a strike group, extensive integrated training in 
analysis and prioritization of threats, maintenance of force protection, and 
execution of military missions is required.  Id.  One specifically pertinent form 
of training involves the use of MFA active sonar.   
MFA active sonar is the most effective means of locating and identifying 
submerged diesel-electric submarines within a ships torpedo range.  Id.  Active 
sonar, as opposed to passive sonar, emits pulses of sound underwater and 
receives acoustic waves that echo off the target rather than merely listening for 
waves but not introducing any into the water.  Id.  Active sonar is particularly 
useful when tracking diesel-electric submarines because such vessels travel 
almost silently, and therefore cannot be detected using passive sonar.  Id.  The 
MFA sonar employed by the Navy emits sound waves with a frequency 
between 1 kHz and 10 kHz.  Id. at 3.  This sonar is complex and requires 
extensive training under similar circumstances in order to be effective, 
including such factors as time of day, water density, salinity, currents, weather 
conditions, contours of the sea floor, and so on.  Id.  In order to achieve the 
necessary expertise, the Navy utilizes training exercises in detecting, tracking, 
and neutralizing enemy submarines, such as those at issue here, in order to 
guarantee that its personnel will perform proficiently as sonar operators in times 
of real threat.  Id.      
The Navy has chosen SOCAL as the location for these training exercises 
due to its proximity to land, air, and sea bases as well as amphibious landing 
areas.  Id.  However, the SOCAL waters are also shared by at least 37 species 
of marine mammals and the effect on these animals, particularly the physical 
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harm and the disruption of behavioral patterns, is highly disputed by the parties. 
Id. at 4.   
II. Decision in the Lower Courts 
The District Court granted the plaintiff's motion, holding that they had 
demonstrated a "probability of success" under NEPA and CZMA, thereby 
prohibiting any use of MFA sonar by the Navy for training purposes.  Id. at 6.  
Following a stay in the injunction pending the Navy's emergency appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed that preliminary injunctive relief was the correct remedy.  
However, the court held that the total prohibition of sonar use must be 
narrowed to provide conditions under which the Navy could continue the use of 
MFA sonar in its training exercises.  Id. at 7.  
On remand, the District Court imposed a new preliminary injunction, 
which allowed the use of MFA sonar only when six mitigating measures were 
satisfied.  Id.  These included, (1) the imposition of a 12-mile "exclusion zone" 
from the coastline; (2) lookouts to conduct additional marine mammal 
monitoring; (3) the restriction of the use of "helicopter-dipping" sonar; (4) the 
limitation of MFA sonar in geographic "choke points"; (5) the shutdown of 
MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of the vessel; 
and (6) the powering down of MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface 
ducting conditions.  Id.  Of these, the Navy challenges only the last two 
restrictions.   
In response to this injunction, the President, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 
§1456(c)(1)(B), granted the Navy an exemption to CZMA after determining 
that the continuation of the restricted exercises "was 'essential to national 
security," and that adhering to the injunction imposed by the District Court 
"would 'undermine the Navy's ability to conduct realistic training exercises that 
are necessary to ensure the combat effectiveness of…strike groups.'"  Id. at 8.     
In concert with the President's action, the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), pursuant to 40 CFR §1506.11, in response to what it deemed 
"emergency circumstances" authorized the Navy to implement "alternative 
arrangements," which were deemed appropriate because the injunction created 
an unreasonable and significant risk that the strike groups would be unable to 
train and certify as necessary.  Id.  According to these arrangements, the Navy 
was able to continue the operation of MFA sonar, subject only to the original 
conditions upon which its exemption from the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
of 1972, 86 Stat. 1027, was granted.  Id. (See Id.   at 5 for original restrictions).  
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In response to these exemptions, the Navy moved to vacate the District 
Court's injunction with respect to the last two restrictions, however, the District 
Court refused to do so and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 9.  In doing so, the 
Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs had successfully shown a likelihood 
of success and a "possibility" of irreparable injury, further holding that the 
negative impact on the Navy's training exercises was "speculative" at best.  Id.  
The court also questioned whether there was a true "emergency" as suggested 
by the CEQ, and concluded that the preliminary injunction was predictable in 
light of the litigation history.  Id.  With respect to the two challenged 
restrictions, the court found that: (1) the 2,200-yard shutdown zone was 
unlikely to affect operations because the Navy often shuts down the sonar 
system during training and (2) the power-down requirement was not 
unreasonable because significant surface ducting conditions, when sound 
travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences, are 
relatively infrequent, meaning that various groups were certified without ever 
facing such conditions.  Id.  at 10.   
In response to the lower court's holding, several Navy officers testified that 
not only was the use of MFA sonar "mission critical," but the two challenged 
restrictions made it impossible for the Navy to accomplish realistic training.  Id. 
  at 15.  Specific aspects of training that can be affected include the ability to 
learn how to avoid sound reducing "clutter" from environmental conditions and 
ocean floor layout, instruction on how to avoid interference, and practice 
coordinating efforts with other sonar operators.  Id.   
III. Decision in the U.S. Supreme Court 
After granting certiorari, the Court held: (1) the correct standard for 
preliminary relief requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that an irreparable injury is 
likely in the absence of an injunction; (2) even if the likelihood of irreparable 
injury has been shown, it is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's 
interest in satisfactory training; (3) preliminary injunction as a remedy is the 
exception and the court must balance the competing claims of injury when 
considering such a grant; and (4) the lower courts' erred in granting preliminary 
injunction, most notably by failing to give the Navy's concerns adequate 
weight.  It is important to note that the Court did not address the underlying 
merits of the suit, but did state that the foregoing analysis makes it clear that 
any permanent injunction on the same grounds would also be an abuse of 
discretion.   
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IV. The Standard for Preliminary Relief 
The Court held that, "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."  Id.   at 
10.  The Court found the lower courts' findings of irreparable harm 
problematic, but ultimately stated that even if the plaintiffs were assumed to 
have met the likelihood showing required, any irreparable injury is outweighed 
by "the public interest and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of 
its sailors."  Id. at 13. The Court found that consideration of these factors alone 
necessitate a denial of injunctive relief, and therefore found not reason to 
address the likelihood of success on the merits.  Id. at 13-14.    
V. Injunctive Relief as the Exception 
In each claim for injunctive relief, a court must balance the claims of 
injury on each side.  In this case, the Court found that the lower courts 
underestimated the burden imposed on the Navy by the injunctive relief.  In 
general, the professional judgment of military personnel will receive great 
deference when determining the outcome of a balance of equities.  Here, the 
Navy asserts that the MFA sonar is "mission-critical" and that realistic training 
cannot be accomplished in accordance with the two challenged restrictions.  Id. 
at 15.  When this interest is examined in combination with the public interest in 
a well-trained military force, the Court found that the balance strongly favored 
the Navy.  Id.  at 16.  The Court went on to examine the specific implications of 
each of the challenged restrictions and found that both placed a significant 
burden on the Navy's ability to adequately train its forces.  Id. at 18-20.  
Increasing the radius of the shutdown zone from 200 to 2,200 yards, the Court 
found, would actually increase the overall surface area from 125,664 square 
yards to 15,205,308 square yards.  Id. at 18.  Furthermore, mandatory 
shutdowns often result in the loss of several days' worth of training and make a 
practical difference because the voluntary shutdowns employed by the Navy in 
the past were often at tactically insignificant times.  Id.   at 18-19.  The 
infrequency of surface ducting was unconvincing to the Court as a rationale for 
upholding the restriction because its rarity and unpredictability made it 
especially important for Navy training, and furthermore, the decrease of 6 dB 
made training unrealistic because it amounts to a 75% reduction.  Id.  at 20.   
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VI. Analysis on the Merits 
While the Court explicitly declines to address the underlying merits of the 
plaintiff's claims, it states, "[W]hat we have said makes clear that it would be an 
abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction, after final decision on the 
merits, along the same lines as the preliminary injunction."  Id.   at 22.  The 
factors discussed above, it found, were relevant in assessing any injunctive 
relief, either preliminary or permanent.  Id. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the District Court abused its 
discretion by imposing the two challenged restrictions, and therefore reversed 
the Court of Appeals and vacated the preliminary injunction to the extent that it 
was challenged by the Navy.      
VII. Concurring in Part; Dissenting in Part 
Justice Breyer identifies the issue at hand as a question of whether the 
District Court was "legally correct in forbidding the training exercises unless 
the Navy implemented the two controverted conditions" and whether these 
conditions properly balanced the harms on each side of the dispute.  Id. at 2 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  The purpose of the 
injunction was to impose fuller consideration for environmental effects that an 
EIS, as required by NEPA, would take into account.  Id.  at 3.  Therefore, the 
lack of injunctive relief would actually impose the exact harms that NEPA is 
meant to cure.  Id.  However, Justice Breyer states that the record before the 
Court lacks adequate support for an injunction imposing the two challenged 
requirements for five main reasons: (1) the evidence showing a need for the two 
special conditions is uncertain, specifically because the harm posed by these 
two requirements has not been assessed separately from the six original 
requirements; (2) the Navy has filed affidavits explicitly addressing the two 
restrictions' interference with adequate training; (3) the District Court failed to 
address why the Navy's contentions were rejected; (4) the Court of Appeals 
failed to adequately explain its rejection of the Navy's arguments; and (5) the 
injunction was originally remanded in order to assure that the Navy was able to 
continue training exercises—a purpose that both lower courts failed to argue 
was satisfied.  Id.  at 3-9.  
For the above reasons, the concurrence would vacate the preliminary 
injunction with respect to the two challenged restrictions as they apply to the 
Navy.  Id.   at 9.  However, while Justice Breyer would normally call for a 
remand, in this case any such action by the District Court would be rendered 
moot by the EIS that is expected to be finished by February of 2009.  For this 
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reason, the Justice would impose the interim policies adopted by the Court of 
Appeals pending resolution by this Court until the full EIS is ready.  Id.  at 10.  
VIII. Dissent 
The dissent argues that the judgment of the Ninth Circuit should be 
affirmed for various reasons.  Id. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  First, by 
acting before preparing an EIS, the Navy has thwarted the very purpose of the 
NEPA, and indeed does not even dispute its obligation to prepare an EIS in the 
future.  Id.  at 1.  Secondly, if the Navy was unable to adhere to the 
requirements of NEPA before acting, it should have sought legislative 
exemption.  Id.  at 6.  On top of these factors, the majority's estimate of harm 
actually misinterpret the  predictions of the environmental assessment, which 
show a significant amount of potential harm.  Id.  at 11.  In summation, because 
there is likely, substantial harm to the environment, an almost inevitable 
success on the merits for the plaintiffs, and a great degree of public interest in 
taking environmental precautions before acting, the dissent finds no abuse of 
discretion in the mitigating measures upheld by the Ninth Circuit.  Id. at 12.   
